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Abstract: This article examines how international organisations with
mandates in health and development interpret global economic crises
and respond to disease. It contributes the perspective of World Bank to
emerging scholarship on the various factors leading to the decline of
the World Health Organization (WHO) and its Health for All (HFA)
mission during structural adjustment. It does so by telling a story of
collaboration and conflict between WHO and World Bank’s Population,
Health and Nutrition (PHN) Department following the ambitious Alma
Ata Declaration in 1978 until the initial global AIDS response. As
debt crises emerged in Latin America in the early 1980s, WHO tried
to find a way forward for HFA. However, the African crisis of 1985
fractured the international community’s support, causing WHO and PHN
to dialogue more closely regarding health sector financing. As AIDS
became a global crisis, this culminated in their 1987 joint research on the
disease’s macroeconomic and demographic impact. However, observing
WHO’s continued hesitance regarding financing and its decision to act
as a donor gatekeeper, the Bank ultimately opted to work separately
in AIDS. Thus, the themes of the Alma Ata versus Selective Primary
Health Care debate of the late 1970s continued throughout the 1980s
into the early years of the global AIDS response: a perennial conflict of
financing within resource constraints and the appropriate role of donors
in the grand project of health and development.
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Introduction
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the World Health Organization (WHO)
once again reoriented its focus towards the social determinants of health.1 Hearkening
back to the Alma Ata Conference on Primary Health Care, Director-General Margaret
Chan declared that:
[a] previous effort to use health as the route to socioeconomic development, launched in 1978, was followed
almost immediately by a fuel crisis, soaring oil prices, and the debt crises of the early 1980s. In the international
response to these crises, mistakes were made when budgets were shifted away from investments in the social
sectors, most notably health and education.2
The incident referred to was the aftermath of WHO’s call for Health for All (HFA) and
the rise of the World Bank’s neoliberal stance on health financing in the 1980s, which
historians have characterised as the transition from ‘international’ to ‘global health’.3 In
the immediate post-war period, WHO pursued technocentric disease programmes with
varying degrees of success. By the liberal 1970s and the rise of the non-aligned movement,
WHO’s social medicine-oriented Director-General Halfdan Mahler famously declared
commitment to Primary Health Care (PHC) in 1978. Similarly, though World Bank was
intended to reconstruct a war-torn Europe, in the 1970s under the leadership of President
Robert McNamara, it turned attention to social sector issues first in population and later
in nutrition, health and disease, as Jennifer Ruger has detailed.4 This culminated in
McNamara’s establishment of the Population, Health and Nutrition (PHN) Department
in October 1979, which allowed the Bank to loan for single-issue health projects. Unlike
the UN system, the Bank raises funds through private markets or trust funds, and could
thus issue project loans at scales WHO’s grant-funded programmes could not. Finally, as
the home of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the lender of last resort for national
balance of payments crises, the Bank was integrated into the international financial system
in ways that WHO was not.
The Bank’s role in structural adjustment during the 1980s has been controversial. This
was because of the global economic recession in developing countries following the 1979
oil shock, the impact of which World Bank had a significant hand in managing. Critical
public health scholarship has argued that the Bank through its various instruments set
loan conditionalities that restructured the role of the state in delivering public goods such
as health.5 It has shown that, in contrast to HFA, the reforms reduced public health in
1 World Health Organization (WHO), Closing The Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the
Social Determinants of Health (Geneva: Switzerland, 2008); WHO, Primary Health Care: Now More Than Ever
(Geneva: Switzerland, 2008).
2 WHO, ‘Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on Health: Statement by WHO Director-General
Dr Margaret Chan’, 12 November 2008. Available online at https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/
2008/s12/en/. Last accessed 24 October 2019.
3 Theodore Brown, Marcos Cueto and Elizabeth Fee, ‘The World Health Organization and the Transition
from “International” to “Global” Public Health’, American Journal of Public Health, 96, 1 (2006), 62–72;
Marcos Cueto, Theodore M. Brown and Elizabeth Fee, The World Health Organization: A History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2019); Alexander Medcalf, Sanjoy Bhattacharya, Hooman Momen, Monica
Saavedra and Margaret Jones (eds), Health for All: The Journey to Universal Health Coverage (Hyderabad:
Orient Blackswan, 2015).
4 Jennifer Ruger, ‘The Changing Role of the World Bank in Global Health’, American Journal of Public Health,
95, 1 (2005), 60–70.
5 Mohan Rao (ed.), Disinvesting in Health: The World Bank’s Prescriptions for Health (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1999); Imrana Qadeer, Kasturi Sen and K.R. Nayar (eds), Public Health and the Poverty of Reforms:
The South Asian Predicament (London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001).
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developing countries to focus solely on diseases that represented the greatest burden,
extending from the perspective of Selective Primary Health Care (SPHC). SPHC presumed
that in contexts of severe resource constraints, developing countries could do little more
than control the worst of infectious diseases, echoing colonial public health wherein the
main concern was the security and protection of empire. Operationally, this view was
expressed through vertical targeted interventions for single diseases that represented the
most cost, direct or indirect, run by a mix of public, non-profit and for-profit private actors.
Histories of international and global health have since pointed to a wide range of factors
that led to the decline of WHO and its Health for All mission. Earlier scholarship focused
on Cold War politics, such as the fight to hold the 1978 conference in the Kazakh Soviet
Socialist Republic, which Socrates Litsios has illuminated.6 Alexander Medcalf and Joa˜o
Nunes analysed WHO’s visual mass communication strategies to ‘market’ HFA.7 Marcos
Cueto and Randall Packard have pointed to former WHO supporters such as UNICEF
deciding cost-effective interventions for children would be more realistic, particularly
immunisations, breastfeeding and oral rehydration.8 William Muraskin has shown the
subsequent resurgence of eradication fascination to replace HFA.9 Finally, Marcos Cueto,
Theodore Brown and Elizabeth Fee show that HFA faced particular challenges under
Mahler’s successor, Hiroshi Nakajima, who focused on the biomedical aspects of health at
the expense of primary care and personally displayed a lack of diplomacy with the US and
health funders of increasing influence like the Bank.10
Scholars have also focused on how the broader 1980s debt crises impacted international
organisations’ perceptions of their respective missions in the health field. Nitsan Chorev
identified the United States under President Ronald Reagan as the main reason for the
neoliberal shift in international health.11 Reagan sought to combat what was perceived
as overrepresentation of developing countries’ interests at UN forums, including WHO’s
primary health care, and sought instead to work through World Bank to ensure developing
countries repaid their loans to American banks. Michael Merson and Stephen Inrig
recently recounted how in the early years of the Global Programme on AIDS, Director
Jonathan Mann was ambivalent towards the Bank’s push for cost-effectiveness in AIDS
interventions.12
This article contributes to this emerging scholarly strand on the ‘neoliberal turn’ in
global health. By drawing on archival material from World Bank, it incorporates the
perspective of Bank health experts in the PHN Department from the aftermath of Alma
Ata throughout the 1980s, at the same time that AIDS emerged as an unknown yet
6 Socrates Litsios, ‘The Long and Difficult Road to Alma-Ata: A Personal Reflection’, International Journal of
Health Services, 32, 4 (2002), 709–32.
7 Alexander Medcalf and Joa˜o Nunes, ‘Visualising Primary Health Care: World Health Organization
Representations of Community Health Workers, 1970–89’, Medical History, 62, 4 (2018), 401–24; Jon Lide´n,
‘The World Health Organization and Global Health Governance: Post-1990’, Public Health 128, 2 (2014), 141–7.
8 Marcos Cueto, ‘The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary Health Care’, American Journal of
Public Health, 94, 11 (2004), 1868; Randall Packard, A History of Global Health: Interventions into the Lives of
Other Peoples (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 285.
9 William Muraskin, The Politics of International Health: The Children’s Vaccine Initiative and the Struggle to
Develop Vaccines for the Third World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 28.
10 Cueto, Brown and Fee, op. cit. (note 3), 239–79.
11 Nitsan Chorev, The World Health Organization between North and South (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2012), 130–40.
12 Michael Merson and Stephen Inrig, The AIDS Pandemic: Searching for a Global Response (Switzerland:
Springer International Publishing, 2018), 261–3.
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potentially devastating disease. It sheds new light on the negotiations, collaborations and
disagreements between the two agencies, filling a gap in the recent historiography that
seeks to unearth the various interlocking factors for HFA’s decline. The article suggests
that the new neoliberal logic in global health was co-produced through WHO and PHN’s
differing interpretations of the 1980s debt crises, as well as their contrasting views on the
appropriate role of international agencies in health and development.
The relationship between WHO and PHN was complex and interdependent during
structural adjustment, as the lines between health and development blurred. Both
institutions were concerned about the health sector austerity measures that the IMF and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) conditional loans
dictated and HFA was a powerful statement that provided a common framework, until the
mid-1980s. However, whenever they did collaborate, the two were each other’s harshest
critics. PHN thought WHO was making promises it would inevitably be unable to fulfill,
and its response to the 1985 African crisis of famine, civil wars and debt seemed to confirm
this view. Conversely, WHO tended to be stand-offish and aloof, and did not make as much
effort to understand PHN or the Bank’s approach. This was rooted in WHO’s sensitivity
to the Bank’s growing influence in health, as Jason Finkle and Barbara Crane have shown
regarding their population control work in the 1960s and 1970s.13
The article proceeds as follows. First, it looks at how WHO and PHN both re-strategised
their health work amidst balance of payments crises emerging in Latin American countries
in the early 1980s. Second, it shows that the African crisis of 1985 was a critical test for the
logic underpinning HFA, ushering in the era of health systems financing. Third, it examines
PHN and WHO’s 1987 collaboration for AIDS as the culmination of their discussions on
financing. Finally, it studies the separate actions WHO and the Bank took in the early
global AIDS response, selectively incorporating their ongoing dialogue with one another.
In doing so, this article situates global health in the 1980s within broader narratives of
international development and financing, making a case for histories that relate complex
interactions between multiple actors.14
Debt Crises after Alma Ata vs Selective Primary Health Care
Although WHO and its Constitution established on 7 April 1948 that health was ‘a state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease
or infirmity’, the UN body initially pursued technocentric ‘magic-bullet’ interventions
for malaria, tuberculosis and smallpox.15 However, questions of global equity, social
justice and redistribution of resources were gaining momentum during the 1960s and
1970s through the non-aligned movement and its vision for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO). As Nils Gilman has detailed, NIEO in its various iterations laid out
a radical programme for action that would do away with the persistence of colonial
13 Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, ‘The World Health Organization and the Population Issue:
Organizational Values in the United Nations’, Population and Development Review, 2, 3/4 (1976), 367–93.
14 Joseph Morgan Hodge, ‘Writing the History of Development (Part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider)’, Humanity, 7,
1 (2016), 125–74; Lukas Engelmann, Mapping AIDS: Visual Histories of an Enduring Epidemic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 216.
15 WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1946); Sunil
Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–1965 (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006); Sanjoy Bhattacharya, Expunging Variola: The Control and Eradication of Smallpox
(Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2006).
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economic hegemony and integrate developing countries as full and equal participants in
the international community.16
It was within this broader climate, as well as facing criticism of its vertical disease
control programmes, that WHO Director-General Halfdan Mahler famously declared
‘Health for All by the Year 2000’ at the 1978 International Conference on Primary Health
Care in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan.17 Mahler had extensive experience integrating tuberculosis
control in basic health systems and would be HFA’s staunchest advocate. From sanitation
and safe drinking water to maternal and child health, Alma Ata ambitiously proposed a
holistic bottom-up approach to the organisation of health sectors. As Chorev has shown,
WHO was also taking a stance on development aid relationships, as Alma Ata was
particularly encouraging of the flow of technical assistance as well as financial support
from developed to developing countries.18 The Declaration argued that all nations should
‘cooperate in a spirit of partnership and service to ensure primary health care for all
people since the attainment of health by people in any one country directly concerns and
benefits every other country’.19 In addition, the Thirty-second World Health Assembly the
following year placed particular emphasis on the role WHO should play as coordinator for
financial, technical and educational resources for health and to this end, a health resources
mobilisation group was constituted.20 Thus, a significant component of WHO’s HFA was
the vision for a radically restructured global political economy and a specific mode of
technological and financial transfers for health that would flow through WHO.21
Historians have recounted how HFA was subsequently critiqued for being vague,
overambitious and failing to take into account limited resources. James Grant, executive
director of UNICEF, though sympathetic to primary care and once WHO’s ally in the Alma
Ata declaration, joined Robert MacNamara of World Bank, John Gillian of USAID and
John Knowles of Rockefeller Foundation at the Bellagio Conference in 1979 to counter-
propose with the approach of Selective Primary Health Care (SPHC).22 SPHC was based
on Julia Walsh and Kenneth Warren’s controversial paper arguing for more cost-effective,
focused and practical alternatives towards the desirable but currently unattainable goal
of comprehensive primary care.23 It evaluated the major diseases of developing countries
according to prevalence, mortality, morbidity and feasibility of control. How high a disease
was ranked would determine the magnitude of its ‘burden’ on the nation and the point
of intervention, which had to then be carefully planned to ‘use the limited human and
financial resources available most effectively and efficiently’.24
When Mahler announced HFA, Bank health experts had misgivings primarily because
it signalled that WHO’s mandate had been overhauled. From being ‘one of the foremost
16 Nils Gilman, ‘The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction’, Humanity, 6, 1 (2015), 1; Natasa
Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tine and Nada Boskovska, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-
Bandung-Belgrade (London: Routledge, 2014).
17 Packard, op. cit. (note 8), 229, 240.
18 Chorev, op. cit. (note 11), 124.
19 WHO, Declaration of Alma Ata (Geneva: WHO, 1978), Section IX, 3.
20 WHO, Thirty-Second World Health Assembly, Geneva, 7–25 May 1979 (Geneva: WHO IRIS), 21.
21 Gilman, op. cit. (note 16), 1.
22 Richard Jolly, ‘Adjustment with a Human Face: A UNICEF Record and Perspective in the 1980s’, World
Development, 19, 12 (1991), 1809; Marcos Cueto, ‘The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary
Health Care’, American Journal of Public Health, 94, 11 (2004), 1868.
23 Julia Walsh and Kenneth Warren, ‘Selective Primary Health Care: An Interim Strategy for Disease Control in
Developing Countries’, New England Journal of Medicine, 301, 18 (1979), 967–74.
24 Ibid., 967.
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professionally competent organisations’ under the previous Director General, Marcolino
Gomes Candau, that once housed experts on all infectious diseases and served as the
centre of international health regulations, PHN staff felt Mahler was announcing WHO
as a developmental organisation for social justice.25 Nevertheless, it is key to note that
the Bank was supportive of HFA in the early 1980s. First was that HFA was a powerful
statement with much popular support. As health was a still developing area competing with
its more traditional work in population and nutrition, the Bank was still in the position
of learning from WHO. Bernhard Liese, formerly an assistant for public health in the
Operations Policy Department and later deputy chief of PHN in 1980, recalled that ‘[Alma
Ata] was actually in that sense very important because it showed to the two of us [Liese
and colleague K. Kanagaratnam of the Population Projects Department] very clearly – and
we related that to senior management – that we either be part of primary care or we would
not be active in the health sector’.26 As a result, Bank health experts positioned themselves
as ‘mediators’ between HFA and Rockefeller’s controversial Walsh/Warren paper.
In the Bank, we were sitting somewhere on the fence on this discussion. We were sitting between WHO and the
Rockefeller Foundation. And what was our role? Our role was basically to keep the communication open on both
sides.27
Furthermore, HFA’s low-cost, simple and preventive focus seemed to confirm the
ongoing basic needs trajectory under McNamara.28 The Bank’s expansion into health
resulted partially from critiques of the environmental impact of its development projects
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, particularly dams. As environmental advisor James Lee
(who initiated the WHO–UNDP–World Bank Tropical Diseases Research Programme)
stated, the Bank began considering schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis, malaria and other
disease prevention in projects dealing with irrigation and water use from the mid-1970s.29
Thus, when the Executive Board approved PHN to make loans for health in July 1979,
Liese recalled: ‘[T]here was no opposition. There were questions, but it sailed through
wonderfully, as it had been something which was overdue.’30 Finally, the privatisation of
American healthcare was seen as an example to avoid, as the Bank’s first 1975 Health
Sector Policy Paper cautioned against technologised and expensive tertiary care.31
The tone of overall support for HFA with some reservations is perfectly encapsulated
in the PHN’s first output in 1980, setting the tone for the Bank’s first formal health
lending. The 1980 World Bank Annual Report declared the goal of ensuring basic access
to core health services by 2000 but qualified that village workers needed more training,
money would have to be allocated more effectively and staff recruitment and supply
25 Transcript of interview with Bernhard H. Liese by Charles Ziegler, 9 and 17 April 2008 (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2008), 2. Available online at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/18569146832821
9018/Transcript-of-oral-history-interview-with-Bernhard-H-Liese-held-on-April-9-and-17-2008. Last accessed
20 October 2019.
26 Ibid., 14.
27 Ibid., 16.
28 Mollie Fair, ‘From Population Lending to HNP Results: The Evolution of the World Bank’s Strategies in Health,
Nutrition and Population’, IEG Working Paper 2008/3, World Bank Open Knowledge Repository. Available
online at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6406/432090NWP0From1Box0327352
B01PUBLIC1.pdf;sequence=1. Last accessed 22 December 2019.
29 Transcript of interview with James Lee by Bogomir Chokel, 4 April 1985 (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1992), 12–15. Available online at https://oralhistory.worldbank.org/transcripts/transcript-oral-history-interview-
dr-james-lee-held-april-4-1985. Last accessed 17 October 2019.
30 Liese, op. cit. (note 25), 14.
31 Fair, op. cit. (note 28), 4.
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distribution needed improvement. Nevertheless, ‘[t]he Executive Directors agreed that
emphasis should be placed on providing primary level health care to treat common, simple
ailments; on preventive care instead of on curative medicine; on low-cost technologies
in place of sophisticated hospitals and equipment; and on community participation in
health care systems’.32 On the other hand, the 1980 World Development Report was
tentative, arguing that ‘[t]he 1970s have thus witnessed the evolution of a much broader
approach to health policy, including an emphasis on universal low-cost basic health care.
But despite some successful experiments, “primary health care” is still more of a slogan
than a nationwide reality in most developing countries. To change this is the greatest health
challenge of the 1980s’.33
There was a background context to these debates about HFA’s potential. Throughout the
1970s, there were growing concerns for the mounting external debt crises in developing
countries. Unpaid loans from post-war development projects built up due to overly
abundant foreign aid in the absence of domestic savings.34 OPEC nations that accumulated
‘petrodollars’ following the 1970s oil embargoes had channelled them into American
private banks, who then lent significant amounts to Latin American countries. Almost
immediately after Alma Ata, Mexico declared in 1982 its inability to meet international
repayments amounting to US$80 billion, shocking the world, included the Bank, which
had never experienced debt of this scale in a developing country borrower.35 Despite
periodic concerns expressed by the Mexican government and within the Bank throughout
the 1970s, promising news of oil reserve discovery throughout the decade dimmed
accurate economic monitoring and lending continued at an unsustainable rate to further
the institution’s influence.36 Other Latin American countries soon followed, as Chile in
1982 and Peru in 1983 also declared balance of payments emergencies.37
In many ways, WHO tried to redefine HFA in the emerging debt crises. By December
1980, the Executive Board issued specific amendments on the Global Strategy for HFA
by the Year 2000 to reflect the world economic situation, concluding that it could still
be achieved by most nations ‘at no extra cost through the reshaping of their health
systems as necessary and the judicious reallocation of existing resources accordingly’.38
Following this, in 1981, Mahler commissioned Lee Howard, former health director of
USAID, to conduct a large-scale study resulting in the report ‘A New Look at Development
Cooperation for Health’. Based on interviews with bilateral and multilateral donors, the
premise that catalysed the study was that:
32 World Bank (henceforth WB), World Development Report, 1980 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1980), 71.
33 Ibid., 53.
34 Stephen S. Golub, ‘The Political Economy of the Latin American Debt Crisis: Review of Various Works’,
Latin American Research Review, 26, 1 (1991), 175–215; Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, ‘The Balance-of-Payments
Problem in Developing Countries’, The Pakistan Development Review, 12, 3 (1973), 259–72.
35 Martin Honeywell, ‘The world debt crisis’, in Latin America Bureau, The Poverty Brokers: The IMF and
Latin America (Latin America Bureau (Research and Action): Great Britain, 1983), Folder: 1213219, World
Bank Group Digital Archives, 1. Available online at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/532231486658669159/wb
g-archives-1213219.pdf. Last accessed 30 December 2019.
36 Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Vol. 1 (Washington
DC: World Bank, 1997), 498–9.
37 Manuel Pastor, ‘Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the International Monetary Fund’, Latin American
Perspectives, 16, 1 (1989), 79–110.
38 WHO, ‘Health for All by the Year 2000 – Global Strategy: Specific Amendments Made by the Programme
Committee to Document EB67/PC/WP3’, 8 December 1980, Sixty-Seventh Session of Executive Board, WHO
IRIS, 2.
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[i]n view of an uncertain world economic outlook for the coming decade, a healthy skepticism is often expressed
in unofficial discussions regarding the prospect of achievement of such a goal in so short a time. Although there is
emerging consensus on technical objectives and strategies to meet the challenge of HFA, there is less agreement
on its economic feasibility within the next two decades. What then can realistically be done to mobilise resources
both within and external to countries-in-need to achieve minimum access to health services and outcomes for the
world’s majority? How is the bill to be paid? Who will pay?39
Howard’s first finding was that donors’ health assistance was highly dependent on recipient
preferences. Even if health was declared a significant priority in international forums,
countries usually requested health funding either for institutional medicine or when the
investment would bring development to other sectors, such as agriculture, food production
and education. Second, he found national health plans had not been substantially
restructured towards the achievement of HFA by 2000, with most developing countries
prioritising economic or military goals.40 Thus, Howard made a key recommendation that
WHO play a coordinating role to counter the presence of multiple donors with wide-
ranging and sometimes inconsistent agendas, as well as encourage country governments’
serious prioritisation of health.41 However, while the study itself was exhaustive, at over
600 pages, it strangely did not profile World Bank or speculate as to how WHO might
effectively collaborate given the recession, despite it becoming the largest health lender at
this time and a key node in the international financial system.42
Incorporating Howard’s recommendations, WHO’s re-conceptualisation of HFA was
formalised in the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly of May 1981. The Assembly
encouraged member nations to develop stronger management systems, while promising to
be considerate of resource mobilisation and rationalisation, issuing Planning the Finances
of the Health Sector in 1983.43 Moreover, WHO would take responsibility for ensuring
coordination in international health work, strengthening its original ‘unique constitutional
role. . . acting as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work and
ensuring technical cooperation between WHO and its Member States’.44 This renewed
HFA strategy was expressed most vividly at a Financing Health Development seminar
in 1982 in Manila, where Mahler gave a speech titled ‘Eighteen Years to go to Health
for All’. Even in the recession, his belief in HFA remained unshaken.45 In fact, it was
precisely because of the economic crises that non-costly basic primary health care had to
be a priority:
Our Strategy is uncommon sense, and it takes uncommon courage to stand up for it. Moreover, what is the
alternative, particularly in the face of economic realities? We cannot wait until even the most optimistic of medical
conventionalists realises that if resources remain constant and technology becomes more and more costly, the
breakdown point will soon be reached, and even fewer people will have access to health care.46
39 Lee Howard, A New Look at Development Cooperation for Health: A Study of Official Donor Policies,
Programmes, and Perspectives in Support of Health for All by the Year 2000 (Geneva: WHO, 1981), xvii.
40 Cueto, Brown and Fee, op. cit. (note 3), 190.
41 Howard, op. cit. (note 39), 10, 343.
42 Ibid., 7.
43 WHO, ‘Regional Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000: Financial Needs of the Strategy, International
Flow of Resources’, 7 July 1982, WPR/RC33/9, WHO IRIS, 7; E.P. Mach and B. Abel-Smith, Planning the
Finances of the Health Sector: A Manual for Developing Countries (Geneva: WHO, 1983).
44 WHO, Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly (Geneva: WHO, 1981), 24.
45 WHO, ‘Report: Seminar on Financing Health Development in the Western Pacific Region, Manila’, 31 May to
4 June 1982, Regional Office for the Western Pacific, WHO IRIS, 1; ‘Message by Dr H. Mahler, Director-General
of the World Health Organization to the Thirty-third Session of the Regional Committee for the Western Pacific:
Eighteen Years to go to Health for All, Manila’, 20–24 September 1982, WPR/RC33/DIV/2, WHO IRIS, 1–2.
46 Ibid., 2.
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Mahler stressed in particular the member nations’ responsibilities to develop a coherent
health plan appropriate to the context and build up infrastructure in order of priority, which
should naturally begin with primary care: ‘You have to decide what activities if any among
these programmes you require to develop your health system.’47 Finally, he warned ‘not
look to WHO or any other international organisation for supranational salvation. Salvation
will come from national action’.48
Meanwhile, new leadership in the early 1980s of Alden Clausen and Anne Kreuger
signalled a change in the World Bank’s development paradigm. Appointed President in
1981, Clausen was well versed in commercial banking, once serving as Bank of America
president and CEO, which had lent heavily to Latin American countries. Despite this,
Clausen in his new post wrote to Mexican President Lo´pez Portillo on 19 March 1982
that ‘the recent setback for the Mexican economy is bound to be transient, and we will be
happy to be of assistance curing the consolidation process’.49 In addition, Anne Kreuger,
appointed chief economist in 1982, was known for taking an aggressive stance towards
the issue of trade and debt and famously coined the term ‘rent-seeking’ in a 1974 paper to
describe inefficient interventionist public services.50
However, structural adjustment led by Clausen and Kreuger filtered slowly into the
Bank’s first health loans, as the earliest projects from PHN’s establishment until 1986
were supportive of WHO’s HFA and primary care.51 As Mollie Fair has noted, between
1980 and 1986, health loans focused on broadening cost-effective basic healthcare access,
which was partly due to client demand and HFA’s popularity.52 Thus, the 1981 Tunisian
health and population project’s core objective was to expand primary health care.53 Kenya
similarly in 1982 received an integrated rural health and family project loan, wherein:
[a] key element of primary health care, or of any health care system that attempts wide coverage at relatively low
cost, is the use of community health workers (CHWs) with limited training to provide front-line services and to
refer patients to rural health facilities and hospitals.54
Throughout the 1980s, it became clear to PHN staff that these primary care projects had
serious shortcomings in practice. One point of contention was the romance of the village
health worker. As Medcalf and Nunes have examined, WHO heavily centred the figure
of the community health worker in HFA promotion, exemplified in the iconic Chinese
barefoot doctors.55 Liese was one such sceptic, noting that the barefoot doctors themselves
were not the only reason for disease control’s success in China, rather they were placed
within an overall efficient and well-distributed infrastructure of anti-epidemic stations.56
Moreover, the Chinese public health system was undergoing financing reforms during the
47 Ibid., 5.
48 Ibid., 3.
49 Alden W. Clausen to Jose´ Lo´pez Portillo, 19 March 1982, qtd. in Kapur, Lewis and Webb, op. cit. (note 36),
603.
50 Anne Kreuger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, The American Economic Review, 64, 3
(1974), 291–303.
51 Marlee Tichenor and Devi Sridhar, ‘University Health Coverage, Health Systems Strengthening, and the World
Bank’, The BMJ, 358 (2017), j3347.
52 Fair, op. cit. (note 28), 5.
53 WB, ‘Tunisia Staff Appraisal of a Health and Population Project’, 6 May 1981, Report No. 3204-TUN
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981), 2, 36, 61.
54 WB, ‘Kenya: Staff Appraisal of an Integrated Rural Health and Family Planning Project’, 6 May 1981, Report
No. 3409-KE (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1982), 32.
55 Medcalf and Nunes, op. cit. (note 7), 413.
56 Liese, op. cit. (note 25), 13.
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1980s, which the Bank noted in its 1986 rural health and preventive medicine loan.57 This
mixed financing approach included user charges, risk coverage and efficient use of private
sector actors.58
The African Crisis 1985: Testing Health for All
It was ultimately the African crisis of 1985 that crystallised WHO and World Bank’s
diverging views on health. Following Latin America, countries in Africa began facing
mounting debt repayment issues.59 The Bank had been monitoring the situation since
1981, publishing Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa recommending
structural adjustment policies, more popularly known as the Berg Report. The Berg was
roundly criticised, even more so than the Bank’s actions in Latin America, for being
particularly harsh on corruption and parastatals in African governments.60
Moreover, African countries faced continuous drought and famine throughout 1983 and
1984.61 The New York Times reported on 7 June 1983 that it was the worst food shortage
faced in the region since the early 1970s, particularly in Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and
Angola.62 In addition to structural adjustment, the Bank launched a Joint Programme of
Action for sub-Saharan Africa in 1984, appealing for a total of $1 billion, and in 1985
approved a $3 million emergency food aid grant to be distributed by the World Food
Program as quickly as possible.63 Sub-Saharan Africa assumed a centrality in World
Bank’s programming from the mid-1980s onwards, with the Economic Development
Institute expanding policy seminars with senior government officials regarding adjustment
and numerous ‘Special Facilities’ for raising funds or hosting policy consultations
regarding capacity building, agricultural research, small and medium-sized enterprises and
non-governmental organisation (NGO) outreach.64 In the international health sphere, the
African crisis’ dual nature as a humanitarian and a debt problem tested the logic of HFA,
in particular its underlying basis in a New International Economic Order.65
Controversially, WHO decided to respond in a way that expressed HFA’s underlying
principles for self-sufficiency and building up long-term resources over hands-on direct
interventions. This was in part due to limited resources but also because it argued famine
and drought were not particularly new disasters in the region. As with HFA, embedded
57 X. Liu and A. Mills, ‘Financing Reforms of Public Health Services in China: Lessons for Other Nations’,
Social Science & Medicine, 54, 11 (2002), 1691–8; Ian G. Cook and Trevor J.B. Dummer, ‘Changing Health in
China: Re-evaluating the Epidemiological Transition Model’, Health Policy, 67 (2004), 329–43.
58 WB, ‘Staff Appraisal Report China Rural Health and Preventive Medicine Project’, 27 May 1986, Report No.
5876-CHA (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1986), 1; WB, Financing Health Services in Developing Countries:
An Agenda for Reform (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1986), 72.
59 Henry F. Jackson, ‘The African Crisis: Drought and Debt’, Foreign Affairs, 63, 5 (1985), 1081–94.
60 Elliot Berg, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1981); Giovanni Arrighi, ‘The African Crisis: World Systemic and Regional Aspects’, New Left Review,
15 (2002), 5–36; Kapur, Lewis and Webb, op. cit. (note 36), 719.
61 Kapur, Lewis and Webb, op. cit. (note 36), 747.
62 Bernard Weinraub, ‘Famine in Africa is Called Worst in a Decade’, The New York Times, 7 June 1983.
63 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘The Power of the Bank to Make Grants’, 15 February 1985, File: 30158262 WHO, Vol. 7,
World Bank Group Archives [henceforth: WBG].
64 Kapur, Lewis and Webb, op. cit. (note 36), 731–2.
65 Yves Beigbeder, Mahyar Nashat, Marie-Antoinette Orsini and Jean-Francois Tiercy, The World Health
Organization (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998); Kelley Lee, World Health Organization (London:
Routledge, 2008).
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in WHO’s actions was a critique of sudden outpourings of sympathy and charitable
donations that would set up a ‘vicious cycle created by transient alleviation’.66 Actions
focused less on food and refugee relief, since these were the remits of other agencies, and
‘the best way to recovery is to ensure that medium- and long-term measures of health
infrastructure development are undertaken alongside emergency life-saving efforts’.67
Thus, WHO appealed to other members of the international community for help in the
case of Angola or providing packages of oral rehydration salts in Botswana. In Burkina
Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi and Sierra Leone, WHO provided tetracycline
tablets, yellow fever vaccine, health laboratory material and extra budgetary support for
maternal and child health programmes, but also ‘a thorough updating of the country’s
use of health resources in support of health-for-all policies through the health resource
utilisation review (CRU) mechanism’.68
WHO’s focus on the long-term caused concern for the Bank. In a 15 February 1985 letter
to Clausen, Mahler was defensive, arguing that they had a limited capacity to respond to
an emergency such as the one currently ongoing in African nations:
We have just completed another session of our Executive Board during which anxiety was expressed over WHO’s
contribution to the mitigation of the critical situation in Africa. I explained to the Board, and I believe this was
well understood, that WHO’s role in direct emergency assistance is limited but that we have a major role in
cooperating with affected countries in such a way that they not only extricate themselves from the immediate
crisis but make genuine progress in terms of socio-economic development.69
By the Thirty-eighth World Health Assembly, in May 1985, a wide variety of views were
expressed, including several calls for the serious implementation of NIEO.70 Mahler’s
opening speech justified HFA’s focus on building capabilities over providing immediate
emergency solutions:
At best it alleviates; at worst it subjugates. It can produce economic and social dependence that is certainly no less
evil than dependence produced by drugs. There is always the danger that the self-cleansing, self-righteousness
of giving to the unfortunate poor down there will blind the givers to the needs for more fundamental long-term
solutions. I am afraid that danger is with us today.71
Delegates from severely affected African countries presented a range of views, neither
wholeheartedly supporting nor roundly criticising HFA. The Ethiopian representative,
the country where famine was most severe, stressed continued emergency relief from
international agencies. Senegal and Zambia’s delegates similarly argued that the political
instability in southern Africa would mean ‘health for some but not for all’.72 The Sudan
representative related how it was now shouldering new responsibilities as a result of the
66 World Health Assembly, ‘Collaboration within the United Nations System: Emergency Health and Medical
Assistance to Drought-Stricken and Famine-Affected Countries in Africa, Report by the Director General’,
2 May 1985, A38/16, WHO IRIS, 3.
67 Ibid., 3.
68 Ibid., 3.
69 H. Mahler to A.W. Clausen, 15 February 1985, File: Clausen’s WHO, Box: Clausen Papers-WHO
Correspondences, Vol. 1, WBG, 1.
70 However, the Meeting of Nonaligned Health Ministers in New Delhi reaffirmed commitment to HFA by 2000,
with a letter of support stressing technical cooperation amongst developing countries, though it did not articulate a
stance on the economic crises. ‘Communication from the Delegation of India Letter dated 8 May 1985 addressed
to the President of the Thirty-eighth World Health Assembly’, 10 May 1985, A38/INF.DOC./11, WHO IRIS.
71 Thirty-eighth World Health Assembly, ‘Verbatim Records of Plenary Meetings Reports of Committees’, 6–20
May 1985, 16.
72 Ibid., 213.
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crisis, but echoed Mahler’s views on self-sufficiency that ‘[w]e are resolved to depend in
the first place upon our own efforts’.73
By the Thirty-ninth Assembly, member nations began seriously requesting HFA’s
reassessment within the critical economic situation.74 The main critiques dealt with
WHO’s understanding of how scarce resources should be allocated to the health sector.
The Nigerian representative related that the stabilisation measures had demanded sacrifices
on the slow path towards economic recovery, but the government was aggressively
implementing measures to regulate parastatal enterprises, encourage compulsory savings
schemes and push the agricultural sector, firmly adding that:
[t]he grim reality of the economic situation in Africa and the gloomy prospects for the future, at least in the short
term, as described in document A39/4, pointed to the need to refrain from using scarce resources on wasteful and
prestigious programmes and to concentrate on projects to benefit the silent majority, namely the deprived masses
living in rural areas, as well as projects likely to generate internal and external revenue for the government. The
depressed economic situation of the African countries was adversely affecting the health of their people and the
orderly implementation of the health-for-all strategy.75
Other nations similarly requested clarifications regarding the relationship between
development and health, as the Morocco representative asked WHO to explain in more
precise terms what HFA after structural adjustment meant:
[t]he remedies suggested by various international economic and financial organisations to deal with the crisis
were generally confined to reducing public consumption so as to decrease or at least stabilise the external debt.
However, a reduction in public consumption also meant a reduction in health expenditure, since the latter was
not always considered a priority. It was therefore the task of WHO to explain, through studies, the relationship
between socioeconomic development, health promotion and health sector development in the various countries
and regions of the world.76
WHO’s earlier efforts to consider financing after the Latin American crisis, such as the
Howard report, became even more pronounced after 1985. The Seventy-seventh Session of
the Executive Board acknowledged that ‘world economic prospects have deteriorated’, and
that financial planning was the next step.77 In this reassessment, HFA failed because WHO
had not properly costed the plans and health ministers had been reluctant to submit baseline
information that would allow financial master plans, including alternative funding sources.
WHO subsequently promised to promote seminars and studies on health economics and
sector financing.
Meanwhile, the Bank’s loans shifted from primary care towards health sector reform, a
stance it declared outwardly through the 1986 Financing Health Services in Developing
Countries that recommended various cost recovery measures including the controversial
user fees and insurance schemes.78 At the same time, staff were not wholly supportive of
the Bank’s move towards health sector reforms. Nancy Birdsall, who held a number of
senior PHN positions, including Policy and Research Division Chief, recalled that:
73 Ibid., 89.
74 WHO, ‘Repercussions of the World Economic Situation: Report by the Director-General’, 10 December 1985,
EB77/INF.DOC./2, WHO IRIS, 1.
75 Thirty-ninth World Health Assembly, ‘Committee A: Provisional Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting,
Palais des Nations, Geneva’, 10 May 1986, A39/A/SR/4, WHO IRIS, 2.
76 Ibid., 3.
77 WHO, ‘Planning of the Finances of Health for All: Economic Strategies to Support the Strategy for Health for
All, Report by the Director-General’, 4 November 1985, File: 30158265 WHO, Vol. 2, WBG, 2.
78 PHN in 1987 was also decentralised into a division of the Population and Human Resources Department. WB,
Financing Health Services, op. cit. (note 58).
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[b]y the mid-’80s, it was very problematic in the Bank, almost frustrating and annoying, to be working on
sectoral issues, family behavior, the link to policy, education, health, even health financing, which is getting a
little less. . . about program behavior and a little bit more macro. . . .79
Similarly for Liese, it was difficult to believe the reforms were ‘not merely a whitewash’
to compensate for the considerable decline in development aid after the Cold War. The
reforms also had contradictory impacts on the ground. In Indonesia, initially the hospital
charges for patients were seen as practical. Patients unable to pay were exempt, and in
the country’s village classification system, those destitute but needing care were known
to administrators. A few years later, the charges had risen and were levied on all hospital
goers. Doctors had to transfer the funds to the district officer, which were then used to
finance public projects, such as road transport. Patients, even the poorest, were effectively
funding the incomes of both the doctors and the government workers.80
Nevertheless, with WHO’s open acknowledgement that HFA needed reconceptualising,
PHN expanded its advocacy for health financing throughout 1986. To express their
renewed collaboration, WHO (represented by Ingar Bruggemann, Joshua Cohen and
Andres Creese, among others) and PHN (John North, Nancy Birdsall and Anthony
Measham) held an informal brainstorming meeting in Geneva in September 1986 with
the fundamental acknowledgement that:
[h]uge disparities in the distribution of health services are exacerbated, favoring the advantaged at the expense of
the disadvantaged: attempts to offer ‘free care to all’ often turn into ‘some care for a few and little for the rest’,
and unfortunately ‘the rest’ are disproportionately poor.81
The two agreed HFA was weak on costing and ‘[f]acing the political and economic
challenge to match our vision with the actual attainment of health for all – at national
and international levels – may mean that promises to provide free health care have
to be politically swallowed’.82 Moreover, PHN updated WHO on the IMF’s structural
adjustment loans, as ‘The Effects of Adjustment Policies on Health and Nutritional Status’
was part of their agenda for discussion.83 Thus, financing – particularly cost recovery,
mixed insurance schemes and the precise role of government in providing healthcare –
became the crux of the two organisations’ dialogue leading into the era of AIDS.
At the same time, the September meeting was also a chance to think through the
future course of their collaboration. One of the reasons was that the Bank had something
to benefit from collaborating with WHO. PHN particularly wanted help in systematic
collection of health data across countries. As Birdsall, who led the discussion, articulated,
this was because they currently had no way of knowing whether their investments in
health, nutrition and population were working and ‘the Bank is going to have a continuing
interest in monitoring the effects of macroeconomic policy changes on health and other
79 Transcript of interview with Nancy Birdsall by John Lewis, Richard Webb and Devesh Kapur, 15 November
1989 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), 2–4. Available online at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated
/en/906301468157524104/Notes-of-interview-with-Nancy-Birdsall-held-on-November-15-1989. Last accessed
20 October 2019.
80 Liese, op. cit. (note 25), 29.
81 ‘Financing Health Services: PHN Draft Documents’, May 1986, File: 1104244 WHO, Vol. 1, WBG, 8.
82 ‘Jointly Agreed Annotated Agenda World Bank/World Health Organization Meeting on Health Policy and
Collaboration, 3–4 September 1986, Geneva’, 1986, File: 1104244 WHO, Vol. 1, WBG, 2.
83 ‘World Bank/World Health Organization Meeting on Health Policy and Collaboration, 3–4 September 1986,
Geneva’, 1986, File: 1104244 WHO, Vol. 1, WBG, 3.
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aspects of “living standards”’.84 USAID had been a pioneer in this kind of comprehensive
global data system through its World Fertility Surveys (WFS), Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) and Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS). PHN sought to do something
similar, for which it deemed that ‘WHO ought to take the lead in mounting such a[n]
effort’, while the Bank provided financial and technical assistance.85 WHO was still the
premier technical expert on health and retained its potential to be a research coordinator, as
PHN proposed ideas such as joint research in vaccine and drugs development and human
reproduction.
Meanwhile, the Bank had quietly begun lending for AIDS, adding components to
ongoing population, family health, disease control or sexually transmitted disease (STD)
programmes in African countries as well as Brazil and Haiti, where the disease was
considered most serious at the time.86 However, project details as described in 1987
indicated a reluctance to take charge independently of WHO regarding the biomedical
and public health aspects of an unknown disease. The most detailed programmes were in
Zaire, Zambia, Uganda and Burundi, wherein projects were as advanced as establishing
surveillance systems, screening all blood donors, rolling out public education initiatives
and even ‘[i]ntegration of AIDS control activities (e.g. blood screening, instrument
sterilisation, case management, social support to families, counselling of patients) in the
national health system’.87 In other countries, AIDS components were sparsely detailed.
The Bank’s first involvement was in Ethiopia in April 1987 under the existing Family
Health Project, though it ‘[did] not presently include AIDS components in a direct way’.88
Niger’s ongoing project was to be remolded to contain an AIDS aspect and Tanzania’s
could potentially include condom distribution, though for both ‘[s]pecific activities remain
to be determined’.
Naturally, financing and appropriate allocation of resources guided the Bank in
its earliest approaches to AIDS, as it studied the disease’s economic consequences.
Nevertheless, prevention of an infectious disease was still fundamentally a public good to
be delivered at a national level. The Bank concluded that AIDS should be addressed by
a core national disease control programme because this was an area wherein private for-
profit actors would never involve themselves, particularly for the poor and marginalised.
While in general, developing nations needed to reassess the place of the state in providing
social and welfare services,
[u]nquestionably there are compelling reasons for government to remain a primary provider where private
markets cannot suffice: for example, for disease control programs, for certain other preventive services, and
for curative services in cases where private providers might never step in (remote, poor areas) or where a lengthy
transition period will be required before private providers become well established.89
However, through cost-benefit rationalisation, the Bank concluded that parts of the AIDS
response should be left to private providers, drawing from its earliest experiences in
African countries. For example, blood screening was classified as a private good, while
84 Nancy Birdsall to John North, cc: Paqueo, Bulatao, Hill, Barnum, Measham, 10 July 1986, File: 1104244
WHO, Vol. 1, WBG.
85 Ibid.
86 Callie Boucher and Lisa Pachter, ‘AIDS: The Bank’s Relations with WHO’s GPA and its own Policies’,
6 April 1987, File: 30158262 WHO, Vol. 7, WBG.
87 Ibid., 3.
88 ‘AIDS Components in Bank Projects’, 31 March 1988, File: 30158262 WHO, Vol. 7, WBG, 2.
89 WB, Financing Health Services, op. cit. (note 58), 6.
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information, education and communication (IEC) would be a public good.90 In locations
where there was a low chance of blood donors being seropositive, such as in Nigeria, it
would cost an inefficient amount of government spending on blood testing as a universal
service to screen and exclude that individual. At the rate of $2 per screening, if only one in
30 000 was likely to be positive, it would cost more than $60 000 to successfully identify
that person through government blood testing. Publicly funded testing was therefore
inefficient and should be conducted through unofficial private markets for transfused
blood, which allowed at a small extra cost the service of having blood screened for HIV:
‘the high costs and low benefits from universal screening combined with the private good
aspect of transfusions create an argument for a laissez-faire approach to transfusion’.91
The 1987 Collaboration on AIDS: Macroeconomic and Demographic
Modelling
We do agree that it is critical to maintain a constructive working relationship between our units. We may have
been remiss so far in not giving you a complete picture of our interests and needs in this area, as well as in
coming to the area relatively late. However, my visit here was meant to partly remedy this, and it is unfortunate
that I have not had the chance to discuss the issues with Dr. Carballo or you for more than a few minutes. . . . I
understand that you are all extremely busy, and I therefore do not take this personally. For the future, however, in
the interests of our working relationship, I would recommend some adjustments.92
As AIDS became an international crisis, the two agencies agreed to collaborate throughout
1987 to research the macroeconomic and demographic impact of AIDS in developing
countries. Furthermore, the Bank’s need for WHO’s biomedical and epidemiological
capabilities to create its desired global database for evaluating health projects became
an opening for their cooperation in AIDS. Throughout 1987, PHN seconded to WHO
Mead Over, a health economist, and Randy Bulatao, a demographer and consulting
epidemiologist.93 Drawing from technical assistance missions throughout 1987 and 1988
in the various countries that had requested WHO or Bank assistance, Over was to
investigate a computer-based model for estimating the cost-effectiveness of alternative
AIDS programmes in sub-Saharan Africa which could be applied to any country.94 Bulatao
was to work with James Chin, WHO’s chief of surveillance in the Forecasting and Impact
Assessment Unit, to develop a demographic impact model.95
Unfortunately, there was a great deal of confusion from the very beginning. Bulatao
was not able to meet Jonathan Mann, director of WHO’s Special Programme on AIDS
(SPA), and his colleague Manuel Carballo, for more than a few minutes and Mann later
sent a telegram to Anthony Measham requesting to delay Over’s Geneva visit as he wanted
90 Mead Over to Dean Jamison, ‘Attachment II: Issues in Resource Allocation to AIDS Treatment, Prevention
and Control’, 19 August 1987, File: 30158262 WHO, Vol. 7, WBG, 5.
91 Ibid., 5–6.
92 R.A. Bulatao to Dr J. Mann, ‘Subject: Rationale for the Bank’s Interest in Studying Aspects of the AIDS
Pandemic’, 27 June 1987, File: 30117078 AIDS-WHO-Bank Cooperation, WBG, 2–3.
93 Mead Over to Dean Jamison, ‘Collaboration with WHO Special Programme on AIDS: Back-to-Office Report’,
19 August 1987, File: 30158262 WHO, Vol. 7, WBG.
94 Mead Over to Nancy Birdsall and Dean Jamison, ‘Subject: Cooperation between the Bank and WHO on
Analysis of Economic Impact of AIDS’, 4 June 1987, File: 30117078 AIDS-WHO-Bank Cooperation, WBG,
1–2.
95 Dr J. Mann, ‘Attachment I: Note for the Record on a Conversation on 14 July 1987 Between Myself and Drs
Anthony Measham, Mead Over and Dean Jamison of the World Bank’, 1987, File: 30158262 WHO, Vol. 7,
WBG; James Chin, The AIDS Pandemic: The Collision of Epidemiology with Political Correctness (Oxford and
Seattle: Radcliffe Publishing, 2007).
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‘clarification on the nature and scope of our collaborative relationship on AIDS’.96 When
Bulatao did finally arrive in Geneva, most of WHO/SPA staff had been ‘too busy to see me
for more than a few minutes and declined to discuss their objections’.97 Carballo managed
to find some time to meet with him, but ‘mainly to object to some of my comments and
to question my presence there’. At first, Bulatao thought WHO was not aware of the work
on demographic modelling, though Birdsall had visited them again in May that year to
discuss the Bank’s interests in demographic and economic research. He concluded that the
reason for the lack of a proper reception might be that ‘[p]ossibly SPA/WHO was under
the impression that my visit was solely to assist them, and had no connection to Bank
work’.98
Thus, a significant portion of the collaboration happened through long and sometimes
passive aggressive letters. As Bulatao communicated to Mann and Carballo in the absence
of a face-to-face meeting, initially the Bank chose to ignore AIDS by not factoring it into
its annual demographic projections of each country, which was a traditional practice due
to its investment in population control.99 Though it had already been dealing with AIDS
in a piecemeal fashion starting in 1986 by adding STD or AIDS components to existing
health or population projects, AIDS was such a new issue that he made it clear the Bank
wanted to collaborate with WHO largely because it did not understand how to deal with
outbreaks of disease. However, AIDS was undeniably starting to impact its development
work, meaning it would be ‘irresponsible for us to continue to ignore the phenomenon if
there is something that can be done’.100
Mann, Carballo and WHO/SPA’s stand-offish absence was somewhat unprofessional,
given that the collaboration had already been formally arranged. However, the attitude
of the seconded PHN staff was also not conducive to a working partnership. Bulatao
was defensive when explaining why the Bank acted without consulting WHO, while
acknowledging that it was perhaps late to address AIDS and could have been more
forthcoming about their interests. It had not intended to leave WHO out and an early
draft was provided, the impression being that there were no reservations, but ‘[i]f you
have now come to believe the Bank should not be doing any work on the demography of
AIDS, Dr Measham and Mr Jamison will I am sure consider your arguments carefully, but
will also have to take into account our own needs in the areas of demographic projection
and economic work’.101 Bulatao simultaneously pressed WHO’s help to create the global
database for evaluating health projects. Upon disclosing the Bank’s interests, he followed
with a rather brusque assessment of WHO’s current usefulness, that ‘SPA/WHO cannot
supply appropriate demographic statistics or an appropriate model for our demographic
work, and does not intend to develop the capacity to do this or to directly support any
institution that might provide such input’.102
Ultimately, the collaboration was not fruitful, as Bulatao reported to Dean Jamison, PHN
chief, that WHO/SPA staff had ‘appeared reluctant to accept any Bank role in this area’ and
96 Dr J. Mann to Dr A. Measham, 26 June 1987, File: 30117078 WHO, Vol. 7, WBG.
97 R.A. Bulatao to Dean Jamison, ‘Subject: Visit to WHO Special Programme on AIDS (SPA/WHO), 18–30
June 1987: Back-to-office Report’, File: 30117078 AIDS-WHO-Bank Cooperation, WBG, 1.
98 Ibid., 3.
99 Bulatao to Mann, ‘Rationale’, op. cit. (note 92), 2–3.
100 Ibid., 1.
101 Ibid., 1–2.
102 Ibid., 1.
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ultimately advised that the Bank proceed on its own path.103 While WHO did not intend
to assist the Bank with modelling, there was still potential for the organisation to serve
as a source of epidemiological data, though Bulatao reported that he had ‘found nothing
to indicate any institution with well-developed capacity in this area’.104 Thus, despite an
attempt at multilateral collaboration amidst their increasing dialogue on financing after the
African crisis of 1985, the Bank and WHO were not able to jointly address AIDS due to
contrasting institutional ideologies expressed through individual personalities.
Parting Ways: WHO’s Response to Global AIDS
In the midst of its collaboration with the Bank, WHO had been confronting AIDS as the
international authority on disease control. As Merson (who became director of WHO’s
Global Programme on AIDS in 1990, taking over from Jonathan Mann) and Inrig have
recently shown, Mahler was late to address AIDS as a serious issue, due to his commitment
to HFA and belief that it was limited to the developed West.105 They show, with oral
histories conducted in the early 2000s, that it was through the efforts of first Fakhry
Assaad and later Jonathan Mann that WHO eventually came to form a human-rights-based
strategy on AIDS: what was first called the Control Programme (CPA), then the Special
Programme (SPA) and finally, the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA). AIDS was difficult
to diagnose and treat, unlike diseases of previous WHO programmes, and it was only
after concerted efforts by Assaad, director of the Division of Communicable Diseases,
that Mahler agreed to establish a programme. Because of its complex manifestations and
uncertainty around transmission and treatment, Assaad, Mann, Mahler and other WHO
staff agreed independence and flexibility would be key to a successful response and the
early AIDS programme was placed outside traditional WHO architecture, answerable only
to the Director-General.106
As Cueto, Brown and Fee have noted, GPA under Mann was one of the most influential
and well-funded programmes during a time of financial difficulty for WHO. In some ways,
its strong emphasis on rights against discriminatory ‘containment’ practices responded to
HFA’s underlying concerns regarding targeted intervention.107 At the same time, its extra
budgetary funding at a time when regular contributions decreased made the programme
answerable to donor objectives. As Merson and Inrig detail, WHO understood that
they were in danger of creating precisely the kind of vertical, siloed and unintegrated
programme that reflected Selective Primary Care’s objectives to control only the most
serious diseases in developing countries.108 To counter this, Mann and Mahler promoted
the idea of an integrated intersectoral response under the banner of health promotion,
presenting this public health perspective at the International Conference on Health
Promotion in Ottawa in November 1986.109 Moreover, Mann especially stressed the
human rights aspects of the disease, inspired by early civil society responses in Western
countries.110
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The article’s final section situates Merson and Inrig’s arguments by exploring the
continuities of WHO’s thinking on financing, health and development after the debt
crises. There is no doubt that the organisation contributed a great deal to humane testing,
blood banking, epidemiological surveillance, vaccine and treatment research and overall
prevention systems around the world. However, the section suggests that WHO’s early
AIDS activities continued to not fully resolve the concerns member nations expressed
after the 1985 African crisis. As with its response in 1985, WHO bewilderingly used
global AIDS as an opportunity to resolve what it perceived as persistent problems of aid
coordination by attempting to control and coordinate donors, reasserting its position as the
central agency on health.111 This, in combination with accommodating donor demands as
part of extrabudgetary funding and the arrival of Hiroshi Nakajima in 1988, helps explain
why GPA faced mounting criticisms by the early 1990s and many countries turned to
the Bank’s International Development Association (IDA; concessional social sector loans
designed for the societal impact of structural adjustment) for their first AIDS projects.
While WHO had been active in organising regional consultations specifically for the
European and North American regions as early as 1983, the initial global AIDS response
was formed after the first International Conference on Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome in Atlanta, Georgia in April 1985. Following these preliminary activities,
a Global Strategy for HIV/AIDS was developed in what was then called the Control
Programme on AIDS (CPA).112 CPA’s Global Strategy certainly paid more attention to the
costliness of AIDS in ‘human and financial terms’. WHO accounted for the high treatment
costs in developed countries, as a US hospital patient could expect to pay as much as
$150 000. On the other hand, ‘[i]n developing countries, AIDS patient care depletes the
already limited health care resources’.113 However, WHO/CPA did not extensively detail
how AIDS programmes would be financed, arguing instead that ‘[t]he cost of this initial
phase of a national programme clearly depends upon a variety of country-specific issues,
especially regarding epidemiological surveillance and laboratory infrastructure’.114
During the era of CPA, WHO envisioned that its most appropriate role was as a global
coordinator, mediator and advisor, facilitating communication where various bilateral
and multilateral donors were active in one country. In doing so, WHO was trying to
respond to HFA and NIEO concerns since the early 1980s of uncoordinated donor
responses leading to harmful health effects, epitomised by Howard’s report. First, CPA
would facilitate communication and information exchange between bilateral partners to
coordinate the national programmes. Second, where there were gaps in the programme
due to donor interests, it would provide medical supplies, consultants, evaluation exercises
and other technical assistance. WHO’s role was more mediator, rather than controller, to
‘reduce competition with other agencies and help secure donor dollars to support national
efforts’.115
By the time CPA had been re-established at the Fortieth World Health Assembly as the
Special Programme on AIDS (SPA), WHO had become far more restrictive of donors.
It designated a Joint Management Structure as well as a draft plan for ‘Comprehensive
111 Packard, op. cit. (note 8), 285; Merson and Inrig, op. cit. (note 12), 20.
112 Control Programme on AIDS, Global WHO Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Projected Needs for 1986–1987 (Geneva: WHO, 1986), 5.
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114 Ibid., 9.
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Coordination of Global and National AIDS Activities’.116 Comprehensive coordination
expanded WHO’s global responsibility to ensure effectiveness amidst multiple donor
agendas so that ‘[a]ll governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental efforts,
whether scientific, technical or financial, must be consistent with and supportive of WHO’s
Global Strategy on AIDS as approved by the World Health Assembly’.117 Likewise, all
country-level efforts had to be in line with a WHO-designed and managed National AIDS
Plan, which would be consistent with the overarching Global Strategy, as well as primary
health care within longer-term health goals: ‘[t]here should be a clear expression of the
government’s acceptance of WHO’s responsibility for leadership and coordination’.118
The organisation also designated itself the single gatekeeper between recipient nations
and donors for AIDS funding, conditional upon national governments wholly accepting
WHO’s AIDS strategy.119 Merson argued that a large reason for this controlling response
was that the US had drastically reduced its UN contributions. Building on this, this section
suggests that WHO’s ambition was also a belated reaction to the international community’s
scepticism over its actions in 1985.120
In spite of ongoing dialogue with the Bank, WHO subsequently sought partnerships
with other UN agencies to target the development implications of AIDS. In December
1987, the WHO/UNDP Alliance to Combat AIDS announced that the ‘optimal solution
is to combine the strengths of WHO as international leader in health policy and in
scientific and technical matters related to health, and of UNDP as leader in socioeconomic
development’.121 The drawing in of UNDP was deliberately done to showcase the UN
family’s abilities to collaborate amidst funding difficulties.122 Finally, the echoes of the
debt crises loomed, as the Alliance hoped to assist in better coordination of AIDS activities
for the benefit of both the recipient nation and interested donors: ‘[t]he need for this has
been reinforced by concern expressed by many countries about un-coordinated, ill-timed
or inappropriate offers of external assistance’.123 However, the Alliance was stillborn
as UNDP did not have the in-field staff capacity to adequately carry out the planned
programmes.124 In addition, as Merson and Inrig have noted, there were interpersonal
conflicts between Mann and Elizabeth Reid, founding director of UNDP’s HIV and
Development Programme.125
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Meanwhile, World Bank began to act increasingly independently of WHO, lending
for larger-scale AIDS projects, such as the 1987 Population and Health Project to
Burundi ($14 million) and the 1988 Northeast Endemic Diseases Control Project to
Brazil ($109 million), which included a mass media campaign.126 As with HFA, PHN
staff had increasing reservations about WHO’s global AIDS response. One was in regard
to programme design, given how little was actually known about the disease. Anthony
Measham, after a visit to WHO headquarters, observed that it did not appear to have a
long-term vision for the next five- and ten-year periods, there were too many goals without
prioritisation and it was unclear how contributing donors would receive updates on their
investments. In addition, Mann was, in his view, overly optimistic about increased staff and
budget, though ‘[w]e cautioned against undue haste and a “crash” mentality in building up
the programme’.127 Some of the Bank’s concerns were gently communicated directly to
WHO in more diplomatic tones than Bulatao’s. In an October 1987 telex, PHN Chief
Jamison expressed to Mann that while the Bank was generally ‘sympathetic’ towards
coordination, donors might feel inhibited by the requirements for consistency with the
national plans.128 Jamison advised that WHO embed flexibility into their strategy, at the
very least as a tactful and strategic gesture: ‘to express the possibility of desirability of
such support, rather than an understanding that it will necessarily occur’.129
When Mahler’s term ended in 1988 without re-election, Hiroshi Nakajima became the
new Director-General. If Mahler on PHC and Mann on AIDS had similarly ambitious
social medicine approaches to health, preferring to tackle underlying conditions over
treating manifestations, Nakajima was more a traditionalist and realist, seeking to address
AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease than a problem of socioeconomic development
and human rights. According to Merson, there were significant personal differences
between Nakajima and Mann, leading to a fractured relationship ending with Mann’s
resignation in 1990. WHO faced mounting criticisms into the early 1990s. As Fiona
Godlee commented at the time, the organisation was criticised for its uncoordinated
programmes and management structures.130 GPA had trouble maintaining extrabudgetary
donor support and conflicting relations with other agencies, in particular UNDP, USAID
and Ford Foundation. Thus, after extensive external review in 1992, GPA was dismantled
and in its place, UNAIDS, a multiple donor co-sponsored institution including the Bank,
was established in 1995.
In the meantime, the Bank moved from adding AIDS components to existing population,
health or STD projects to providing large-scale IDA loans for AIDS only: $8.1 million to
Congo in 1988, $84 million to India in 1992, $20.4 million to Chad in 1995 and $24.8
million to Indonesia in 1996.131 These early projects expressed the Bank’s thinking at
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the time regarding cost-effective public–private resource allocation, detailed earlier. For
example, in India, the 1992 AIDS project was the first stand-alone health project after
formal economic liberalisation and the 1987 Bank–Government of India health sector
agreement.132 While the core technical public health aspects were WHO-design, as Assaad
made frequent advisory trips to the country starting in 1986, when the first national case
was identified, the 1992 Indian project reflected key aspects of the Bank’s views on cost-
effective AIDS programmes: training and IEC delivery as public, blood safety as a mix of
public and private banking centres and targeted health promotion by NGOs.133
Thus, after the African crisis of 1985 shifted the dialogue from HFA towards financing,
the Bank and WHO began to dialogue even more closely. Financing concerns carried
over into both agencies’ confrontations of AIDS in developing countries. However,
WHO’s attempt to take top-down control of the global response, as well as conflicts
between individual personalities, resulted in an uneasy division of labour until their co-
sponsorship of UNAIDS: WHO covering the biomedical and public health aspects, with
World Bank providing the funding and programme structure, often at the request of country
governments, within an overarching costed health sector plan.
Conclusion
This article has related a story of collaboration and disagreement in global health
financing during structural adjustment. Incorporating archival data from World Bank and
focusing on its dynamics with WHO, it has contributed to historical understandings of
the aftermath of the Alma Ata versus Selective Primary Healthcare debate in the late
1970s throughout the debt crises of the 1980s to the early era of global AIDS. While
the historiography has examined US pressures on the UN system exerted via World
Bank’s senior management or internal bureaucratic conflicts caused by Nakajima, the
article has looked at individual collaborations and disagreements between WHO and PHN,
particularly focusing on individuals such as Mahler, Mann, Liese, Birdsall and Bulatao,
whose varying interpretations of the debt crises’ implications for health and development
resulted in a tense collaboration.
A key empirical finding is how WHO selectively engaged with increasing pressures by
the Bank and international community to consider financing, while trying to rationalise
HFA’s logic amidst the emerging debt crises. Some of the reasons for HFA’s failure in
the 1980s were circumstantial and beyond WHO’s control. Though Mahler commissioned
Howard’s colossal project to re-conceptualise HFA within the global recession, it would
have been impossible for an interview-based study by one individual to fully comprehend
the complex landscape of post-war health-related aid, particularly when key actors like
World Bank were not covered. At the same time, WHO’s adherence to HFA’s principles
in key moments of expectation by the international community, such as the focus on self-
reliance and long-term health systems development during the African crisis, did not help
the cause of primary care.
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The article has also pointed to how PHN situated itself at various points in the spectrum
between Clausen and Kreuger’s structural adjustment, Walsh and Warren’s selective
primary care and WHO’s social justice-oriented HFA. It has argued for histories of
global health that distinguish World Bank’s functions as an international financing and
development institution from its role as a key stakeholder in global health. It took some
time for PHN to adapt to the health reforms dictated by structural adjustment following the
Latin American crisis of the early 1980s. However, despite its greater lending capabilities,
HFA did serve as a guiding principle for PHN throughout the early 1980s and the Bank
continued to depend on WHO’s biomedical and epidemiological expertise in its first AIDS
projects.
It has been nearly four decades since structural adjustment, a period broadly
characterised as the Bank’s agenda to reform the economies and social sectors of
developing countries towards integration within a capitalist global financial system. In
recent years, there have been calls for more clarity in how the concept of ‘neoliberalism’
is deployed.134 With newly released archival documents, many available digitally, there
is an opportunity to investigate various theories of historical change in global health,
considering themes such as: attempts at mutually beneficial collaboration, well-meaning
but impractical visions, insecurity directed towards a new and upcoming competitor, the
need to accommodate senior management and the agendas of multiple actors.
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